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RATIONALIZING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS:
A LEGISLATIVE PROCESS THEORY OF STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGION
Zoë Robinson*
This Article proposes a new theory of religious liberty in the United States: it
hypothesizes that a person’s religious freedom is dependent on their political power.
Following the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision of Employment Division v. Smith, the
legislature has sole control over the enactment of accommodations and exemptions
from laws of general application for religious adherents. This Article argues that post-
Smith accounts of religious liberty and pluralism fail to systematically analyze the rela-
tionship between religious liberty and legislative exemptions. To this end, the Article
proposes a unique public choice model that hypothesizes that legislative accommo-
dations and exemptions may result from a complex process in which legislators weigh
the gains derived from the prospective exemption or accommodation—in terms of
constituent voting support—against the costs borne. By modeling legislative accom-
modations as the result of benefit-maximizing behavior, this Article proposes a signifi-
cant paradigm shift that postulates a new, and unasked, question: whether the legislature
is overly responsive to majoritarian interests at the expense of minority religious liberty.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
I. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
II. PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
A. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
1. Tier One: Adherent Marketplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
2. Tier Two: Policy Marketplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B. Predictive Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
1. Predicted Legislative Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
2. Predicted Legislative Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. J.D., The University of
Chicago Law School; LL.B. (Hons), The Australian National University College of Law; B.A.,
The Australian National University; B.Mus. (Perf.), Queensland Conservatorium, Griffith
University. The author is indebted to Steven Art, Lisa Bernstein, Alexander Boni-Saenz,
William Buss, Peter Cane, Rosalind Dixon, Carolyn Evans, David Franklin, Jacob Gersen,
Tom Ginsburg, Andrew Gold, Philip Hamburger, Mike Jacobs, Michael Robinson, Adam
Samaha, Jane Stapleton, David Strauss, John Roberts, Terry Smith, Diane P. Wood, and
Carolyn Zabricki for their helpful comments and discussions on earlier drafts. In addition,
I am grateful to participants of workshops at the University of Chicago Law School and the
DePaul University College of Law, as well as Nitin Datt for his excellent research assistance.
133
134 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:133
C. Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
1. Conscientious Objectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
2. Income Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3. Employment Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4. Indigenous Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5. Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6. Other Statutory Exemptions and Accommodations . . . . . . . . . . . 165
D. Preliminary Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
III. IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A. Judiciary-Centered Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
B. Legislature-Centered Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have failed to systematically analyze the ways in which political
majorities affect the regulation of religion in the United States. This neglect is unfor-
tunate because, following the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision of Employment Division
v. Smith,1 the regulation of religion—specifically, the enactment of exemptions and
accommodations for religion—is almost the sole responsibility of the legislature.2
Although there is clearly awareness that majoritarianism is a real concern with respect
to the content and scope of exemptions and accommodations for religious adherents,
there has yet to be any serious attempt to challenge the dominant paradigm of legisla-
tive process involving religion—the public interest model. The public interest model
presumes that while the scope and content of legislation involving religion may gen-
erally align with majority interests, there continues to exist a sense of a common legisla-
tive mission of protecting the public good writ large. That is, unlike legislation that at
base involves an economic transaction,3 legislation that involves religion is not subject
to barter and sale.
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 For more on the decision and its precise holding, see infra notes 27–41 and accom-
panying text. For commentaries on the Smith decision, see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, A Response
to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); David E. Steinberg,
Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 241 (1995); cf. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993
BYU L. REV. 117 (1993).
3 See, e.g., Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3503 (2006);
Allan W. Vestal, Public Choice, Public Interest, and the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition
Act: Time to Derail the “Root Beer Express”?, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 337, 338–39 (1993).
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This Article proposes an alternative model of legislative process for legislation
involving religious accommodations and exemptions—a public choice model. Public
choice is a positive theory that applies economic methodology and techniques to polit-
ical processes.4 Public choice is also a behavioral analysis of political actors (includ-
ing voters and politicians), and rests on the assumptive premise that political actors
act rationally to maximize the value of political outcomes for themselves.5 The public
choice model supposes that any exemptions and accommodations for religion enacted
by the legislature are the product of the conflation of religious lobbying efforts and
the individual self-interest of legislators. Ultimately then, the public choice perspective
asserts that a person’s religious liberty is dependent on their political power. This, of
course, tends the unsavory conclusion that minority religious interests are accorded
less protection than majority religious interests in the United States.
Public choice theory remains highly controversial.6 For the purposes of this Article,
however, I take the current theory on its own terms and propose a basic internal
hypothesis: legislators may trade religious accommodations and exemptions for votes
promised by lobbyists just as they would trade other legislation for votes promised.
To examine the possibility that religious accommodations and exemptions are
bartered and traded on the “legislative market,” this Article utilizes public choice theory
and develops its own unique model. The model in this Article is based on the proposi-
tion that legislative exemptions and accommodations result from a subtle and complex
process through which the suppliers of legislation (the legislators) weigh the gains
derived from the prospective transfer (votes gained) against the costs borne (votes lost).
By assuming that legislative exemptions and accommodations are the result of benefit-
maximizing behavior, the model is the first step in attempting to address the basic
4 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 1 (1991) (specifying that public choice is “the application of the economist’s
methods to the political scientist’s subject”); see also Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice
in Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 1 (Dennis C. Mueller
ed., 1997).
5 Laurence R. Iannaccone, Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion,
in RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND RELIGION: SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 26 (Lawrence
A. Young ed., 1997); Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The
Case of the “Nobel” Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 180 (1988). However, there is a large body of
research that refutes the maximization principle. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 200 (1988); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167,
167–68 (1988); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 137, 138 (2000). On the public choice model, see, for example, Tom Ginsburg,
Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal Scholarship,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1139–40 (2002).
6 Because public choice theory implicates difficult legal, political, philosophical, and
economic concerns, the controversy arrives on many fronts. For objections to public choice
theory, see Ginsburg, supra note 5.
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question: whether the political process is overly responsive to majority religious interest
group lobbying and under-responsive to the needs of minority religious groups.
The proposition that an economic theory of legislation such as public choice is
relevant to issues of religious freedom may seem incongruous.7 Economic principles
of rationality and optimizing behavior are instinctively antithetical to ideas of reli-
gious faith and religious reasoning, and religious freedom seems unquantifiable and
beyond the reach of any economic methodology.8
To the extent that these issues raise questions about the truths of religion, this
Article takes no position. Instead, what this Article does is identify and articulate a new
theory and mode of analysis for thinking about legislative exemptions and accommo-
dations for religion. This Article is primarily concerned with outlining the beginnings
of a new theory as a way of identifying potential process concerns, rather than as a way
of solving them. By developing a public choice model of legislation with respect to
religious accommodations and exemptions, this Article suggests that there is an alterna-
tive reason for enactment of such legislation that is at least as possible as the status quo
and is, therefore, worthy of further study and consideration. Importantly, however, this
Article does not attempt to conclude or develop a practical answer or account of
whether the public choice model (or the public interest model) best fits what actually
happens in the legislative branch. That is, this Article does not provide a rigorous appli-
cation of the model to current religious accommodations and exemptions; that is simply
beyond its scope. Instead, this Article proposes a descriptive model from which subse-
quent applications can be drawn about the process by which religious accommodations
and exemptions are enacted.
Given the prevailing view that the United States was founded on—and continues
to support—the idea of religious pluralism,9 the claim that legislative exemptions could
7 Indeed, although there is a growing body of literature that applies economic analysis to
religion and the church, there is a surprising dearth of literature on the intersection of religion
and the law in law and economics literature. For economic studies on the intersection of law
and religion, see Dean Kelley, Free Enterprise in Religion, or How the Constitution Protects
Religion and Religious Freedom, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM? 114 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman, eds., 1987); Michael W. McConnell &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1989); Eric A. Posner, The Legal Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY
33 (1996). On the economic analysis of religion and the rise of religious liberty, see especially
Corry Azzi & Richard Ehrenberg, Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance,
83 J. POL. ECON. 27 (1975). See also ANTHONY GILL, THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (2008); Laurence R. Iannaccone, Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice
Approach to Religion, 34 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 76 (1995); Laurence R. Iannaccone, Religious
Practice: A Human Capital Approach, 29 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 297 (1990); Richard A.
Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (May 1987).
8 McConnell & Posner, supra note 7, at 1–2.
9 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 2 (2008).
2011] RATIONALIZING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 137
be animated by self-interested politicking has two possible and significant ramifications.
First, the claim could shift our understanding of the current state of religious liberty in
the United States; rather than being a nation tolerant of religious freedom, religious
freedom may in fact be an ideal lacking substance. Second, if in fact democratically
elected officials cannot be trusted to act in the general public interest to protect
generalized religious liberty, and if we continue to value broad religious liberty, we
would be forced to consider various institutional alternatives. Foreshadowing a posi-
tive application of the public choice model in subsequent scholarship, this Article
considers two possibilities. First, it examines the possibility that any finding that
interest groups control religious exemptions justifies more intrusive judicial review.
Indeed, there is an intuitive attraction to the notion that if the political process does not
reflect the will of the people, the judiciary should not defer to it.10 Second, it suggests
that intra-legislative arrangements could be modified so as to heighten transaction costs
for interest groups.11 Specifically, this Article suggests that modifications to the delib-
erative process—for example, altering the committee process at which religious
exemptions are at issue—could temper any interest group influence.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I starts with some necessary background
on the current state of free exercise jurisprudence, as well as on statutory exemptions
and accommodations. Section II presents a novel religion and public choice model.
Although a rigorous application of the model is outside the scope of this Article, a pre-
liminary review of some legislative accommodations and exemptions for religion sug-
gests that a public choice model may accurately capture the behavior of legislators and
interest groups. Finally, Section III addresses the ramifications of a positive application
of this theory for religious liberty. Specifically, this Section considers the implications
of public choice theory for process theories of constitutional design and any impact on
judicial interpretation of statutory exemptions for religion.
I. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
Before proceeding further, some background may be useful. It is well known that
the United States Constitution enshrines a Bill of Rights that protects various funda-
mental rights including free speech and association, equal protection of the law, and
religious liberty.12 The protections for religious liberty are contained within two clauses
in the First Amendment: the “Free Exercise Clause” specifying that Congress shall not
prohibit the free exercise of any religion, and its “Establishment Clause” counterpart
10 See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 33 (1991).
11 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 472 (1988).
12 U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
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stating that Congress “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”13
Together, the clauses have been described as requiring that “government neither engage
in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between
religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.”14 By virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the religion clauses have also been held to be incorpo-
rated and applicable to the states.15
A central question under the religion clauses is the question of “accommodation”
of religion.16 The term “accommodation” (or “exemption,” noting that the two terms
are used interchangeably) refers to “government laws or policies that have the pur-
pose and effect of removing a burden on, or facilitating the exercise of, a person’s
or an institution’s religion.”17 Michael McConnell outlines that the key difference
between a permissible accommodation and an impermissible establishment is that
a legitimate accommodation “merely removes obstacles to the exercise of a religious
conviction adopted for reasons independent of the government’s action,”18 whereas
an impermissible establishment “creates an incentive or inducement . . . to adopt that
practice or conviction.”19
The issue of religious accommodation arises under both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. However, the question of accommodations is distinct in each
context: the question of accommodation under the Establishment Clause asks whether
(or when) accommodations are constitutionally permitted, whereas the question under
the Free Exercise Clause asks whether (or when) accommodations are constitutionally
compelled.20 It is the answer to this latter question—whether or when accommodations
are constitutionally compelled—that Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, and Smith,
are fundamentally concerned with.21
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
15 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940); cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45–46 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring). On the incorporation of the religion clauses, see AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32–41, 42–45 (1998).
16 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555,
556 (1991) (noting that accommodation is “the central motif of religion clause thought”).
17 McConnell, supra note 16, at 686–87. The conception of “accommodation” is a highly
contested issue, and one that is beyond the scope of this Article. On the definitional debate,
see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-5, at 1169 (2d ed.
1988); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 744–45
(1992); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1985).
18 McConnell, supra note 16, at 686.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 708–09.
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In the 1990 decision of Employment Division v. Smith,22 the Supreme Court
rejected the protectionist frame it had applied since 1963 to determine whether a law
impinged on the free exercise of religion. Prior to Smith, beginning with the seminal
case of Sherbert v. Verner,23 the Court held that the Constitution mandates that the gov-
ernment accord religious groups and individuals a special protection or exemption
from laws of general application.24 If such a protection or exemption was not forth-
coming, the government was required to demonstrate that there was a “compelling
state interest” to justify the “substantial infringement” on the free exercise rights of the
plaintiff.25 The Court also indicated that “the State would have to prove the futility
of non-infringing alternatives.”26
However, despite the broad coverage of the Free Exercise Clause established in
Sherbert, claims for religious accommodation rarely succeeded.27 The Supreme Court
almost always denied claimants the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, holding
either that there was no burden on the claimant’s free exercise of their religion28 or
that there was a compelling governmental interest.29 In Smith, then, the Court com-
pleted its retreat from free exercise protectionism by effectively revoking the Sherbert
doctrinal test.30
In Smith, the plaintiffs were denied unemployment compensation following their
retrenchment from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation center after being found
to have used peyote in contravention of an Oregon law prohibiting the knowing or in-
tentional possession of a controlled substance.31 The respondents argued that their pey-
ote use was limited to religious worship for sacramental purposes during ceremonies
22 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24 Id. at 409–10.
25 Id. at 406.
26 Adam Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291,
1335 (2004); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 406–09.
27 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Reversal
of Roles, 2001 BYU L. REV. 611, 611 (2001). Note, however, that this statement excludes
decisions involving employment claims, which was the factual context of the Sherbert decision.
28 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–52 (1998)
(logging of forest to create a road near enough to sacred Native American lands to be a distur-
bance did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor,
471 U.S. 290, 303–05 (1985) (requiring religious volunteers to accept a minimum wage did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
29 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986) (holding that the gov-
ernment interest in military uniformity and morale overrode the appellant’s religious liberty
claim to wear the yarmulke while in uniform); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 604 (1983) (holding that eradication of racial discrimination in educational policies was
sufficient to override the religious claims and allow the government to deny tax benefits to a
discriminatory institution).
30 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883–85 (1990).
31 Id. at 874.
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of the Native American Church, and was therefore protected by the Free Exercise
Clause.32 The Court disagreed, holding that
[w]e have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting con-
duct that the State is free to regulate . . . the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
“valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion pre-
scribes (or proscribes).”33
The Court stated that a law will not be invalid unless it discriminates against a
religion or religions, either on the face of the legislation or at its purpose.34 Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, generally any special accommodation for religious practice
is not constitutionally mandated; subject to two limited exceptions, it is discretionary
and emanates only from legislative will.35
The United States Code is filled with examples of statutory exemptions and accom-
modations for religion. Indeed, from the outset, “American colonies, state legislatures,
and Congress have carved out many statutory exemptions” for religious adherents.36
The accommodations and exemptions were generally formed independent from and in
advance of judicial decisions, although some statutory exemptions were reactionary—
created to overcome restrictive judicial decisions.37 These accommodations can be gen-
eral or they can favor a particular religion.38 For example, early accommodations for
32 Id.
33 Id. at 878–79 (citations omitted).
34 Id. For a “pure” application of the Smith doctrine, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533–37 (1993). Note that Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Smith qualified the general rule with two exceptions: first, claims that combine free
exercise claims and claims arising from other constitutional provisions (or “hybrid” claims);
and second, claims in contexts that “invite consideration of . . . particular circumstances”
(specifically, unemployment compensation cases). Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85. For commentary
on the “exceptions” to the Smith doctrine, see 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 80–81 (2006), noting that “Employment
Division v. Smith marks a crucial divide in free exercise law.”
35 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. Note also that some commentators consider it possible to read
Smith more narrowly. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty,
40 CATH. LAW. 25, 26 (2000); Samaha, supra note 26, at 1336.
36 Louis Fisher, Statutory Exemptions for Religious Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 291,
291 (2002).
37 Id.
38 It is this aspect of religious accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause that has caused
the most controversy, with scholars and judges claiming that this creates an Establishment
Clause problem. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2005); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 310–12 (1952); Ira C. Lupu, supra note 16, at 556.
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conscientious objectors targeted Quakers and Mennonites, whereas more recent accom-
modations have focused on the religious needs of Native Americans and the Amish.39
Even before Smith, then, the strongest protection available to individual religious
adherents and religious groups was legislative protection given that, as noted above,
litigation under the Free Exercise Clause was rarely successful.
This does not mean that the pre-Smith constitutional doctrine lacked value. In fact,
the value of the pre-Smith doctrine was significant: it guaranteed judicial oversight, a
second, at any generally applicable law that an individual claimed infringed their re-
ligious freedom.40 As McConnell has noted, although religious liberty pre-Smith was
generally reliant on the “ability of religious individuals and groups to persuade govern-
ment officials to provide reasonable accommodations to their religious needs,” the pre-
Smith doctrine “helped persons aggrieved by neutral and generally applicable laws to
obtain a second look from an official who might be less impressed by the bureaucratic
imperative of enforcing the rules as written, all the time, without exception.”41
The traditional model of government would predict that, following Smith, the
legislature would cease to enact accommodations and exemptions for religion. After
all, without any constitutional imperative, the legislature has no reason to act to protect
religious liberty more generally. Basic political science characterizes judicial review
as essential to strong protection of individual rights from majority rule,42 and the ca-
pacity of individuals to challenge legislative action in the courts affords an opportunity
for minority interests to overcome majoritarian rule.43 However, when we look at the
legislative record of Congress post-Smith, this is not the way it has played out.
The foremost example of legislative accommodative action can be seen in
Congress’s legislative response to the Court’s ruling in Smith. Following the Court’s
decision that there were no constitutionally mandated exemptions from generally ap-
plicable and neutrally expressed laws, and under the influence of unified and diverse
religious groups,44 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
to effectively reverse the decision.45 RFRA’s purposes were to “restore the compelling
39 LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS, 87–91 (2002).
40 Id. at 5; McConnell, supra note 27, at 612.
41 McConnell, supra note 27, at 612.
42 FISHER, supra note 39, at 4–5.
43 Id.
44 There was broad unification between Democrats, Republicans, the ACLU, Americans
United, American Center for Law and Justice, the Christian Legal Society, the American Jewish
Congress, and the National Association of Evangelicals. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 39, at 80;
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 180 (2d ed. 2006).
45 See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 180. On judicial supremacy, see,
for example, LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS (1999). Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 373–79 (1986); CHRISTOPHER
L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE
IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004).
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interest test . . . guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.”46 President Clinton stated at his
signing of the legislation into law that:
[T]his act reverses the Supreme Court’s decision Employment
Division against Smith and reestablishes a standard that better
protects all Americans of all faiths in the exercise of their religion
in a way that I am convinced is far more consistent with the intent
of the Founders of this Nation than the Supreme Court decision.47
This example flips the basic concerns of post-Smith majoritarianism on its head:
whereas the Supreme Court in Smith discarded any significant claim over protection of
minority religious rights and decreed that the political branches could enact majoritar-
ian policy without regard to minority concerns, Congress—the traditional majoritarian
institution—explicitly determined that all interests should be taken into account when
they do not impact on government interests. Moreover, the RFRA passed the House
of Representatives with a unanimous vote, and the Senate with a near unanimous,
97–3 vote.48
The change of predictive roles becomes even more stark when one considers the
Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,49 which held that the RFRA was uncon-
stitutional insofar as it applied to the States based on the principles of separation of
powers and federalism.50 The Court stated that the RFRA was “so out of proportion to
a supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”51 It is not the point of this Article
to address the correctness of the decision—indeed, others have done so.52 Rather, what
Flores indicates is the absolute failure of the normative predictions of the institu-
tional capacity (and aspirations) of the political branches vis-à-vis the judicial branch
of government—that is, judicial review is not providing the presumed safeguard
for minorities against majoritarian interests, but rather the judiciary is imposing
“majoritarian” judgments on a rights-conscious legislature.
46 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2000).
47 Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 2377 (Nov. 16, 1993).
48 Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1993, at A18.
49 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
50 Id. at 536; see William G. Buss, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L. REV. 391 (1998).
51 Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
52 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique
of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 153–57 (1997).
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Although the RFRA exchange is perhaps the most prominent example countering
the standard predictive claim of institutional capacity and competence, it is not isolated.
Looking more broadly, there are countless examples of statutory accommodations
enacted by the democratic branches on broad and diverse subjects.53 However, the
simple existence of these exemptions does not tell us much about the scope of religious
liberty in America. It does not, as McConnell claims, demonstrate that the post-Smith
exemptions were enacted “precisely in order to provide protection for individual rights
that the courts failed to provide.”54 An examination of legislative outputs is insufficient.
A simple observation that the number of legislative outputs accommodating religion is
greater than zero does not answer the question of the scope and content of those accom-
modations. Further, there is no imperative to accept the implicit assumption of scholars,
such as McConnell and Fisher,55 that the legislature is animated by virtue when it enacts
religious accommodations and exemptions. There is no reason to necessarily assume
that the mere existence of statutory accommodations demonstrates a desire on the part
of the legislature to protect religious liberty. Evaluation is an important part of rights
practice and scholarship, and if the goal remains strong protection of religious liberty,
we must examine and challenge the standard account with alternative theories that as-
sess the capacity of the legislature to protect the religious liberty of all Americans.
This is the goal of Section II.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL
Law and religion scholars, as well as legislators, often claim that religious groups
and religious accommodations and exemptions are animated by the “public interest.”56
“Public interest” is the notion that individuals and groups set aside their narrow self-
interest and act as “civic republicans,” supporting wide-ranging protections for all
religious actors.57 However, at first glance this public interest model seems falsi-
fiable on its own terms. Religious interest groups are formed precisely for the purpose
of lobbying Congress for benefits for the denomination or church that they represent.
It seems artificial, then, to claim that these interests groups are acting in the public
interest writ large.
This Section proffers an alternative model to explain the behavior of religious inter-
est groups and the legislators that perpetuate religious accommodations and exemptions
53 Indeed, a relatively recent survey of accommodation provisions in U.S. state and federal
laws found that more than 2,000 statutes protect religious minorities. See James E. Ryan, Note,
Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1407, 1445 (1992).
54 McConnell, supra note 27, at 614.
55 FISHER, supra note39, at 231–32 (2002).
56 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The
Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples
to Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 435 (2010).
57 Id. at 59–61, 70–73.
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post-Smith—a public choice model. Public choice theory is a positive theory that
applies economic methodology and techniques to political processes.58 Public choice
is also the analysis of the behavior of political actors (including voters, politicians,
and government officials), and rests on the assumptive premise that political actors act
rationally to maximize the value of political outcomes for themselves (taking into ac-
count the costs and benefits of the political activity).59 The maximization premise is, of
course, “a simplifying assumption to be employed and assessed within the context of
predictive models that are themselves simplified representations of reality.”60 However,
the maximization premise has proved valuable in law, economics, and the social sci-
ences more generally, and is well suited to building and testing models of political
behavior.61 In short, the public choice model is helpful for developing a descriptive
paradigm for examining the relationship between religion and politics, something that
has yet to be done despite the extensive literature addressing the relationship between
law and religion.62
Public choice theory, then, is not concerned with normatively idealized institu-
tions;63 rather, it is concerned with identifying the strengths and weaknesses of real
world institutions as a means of conducting meaningful assessments of current political
institutions. A public choice analysis of statutory accommodations and exemptions
enables us to challenge the standard intuition that religious accommodations and
exemptions are parceled out by the legislature in order to benefit the public welfare.
The idea that religion operates outside the realm of politics can be traced back
to the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights64 and James Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.65 In the Memorial, Madison spec-
ified that a just government “will be best supported by protecting every citizen in
the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person
and property.”66 Since then, a romanticized vision of religion and politics has persisted
58 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
59 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; Daniel A. Farber, Introduction to PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW ix–x, (Daniel A. Farber ed., 2007).
60 Iannaccone, supra note 5, at 26–27.
61 See sources cited supra note 5.
62 But see generally GILL, supra note 7.
63 Indeed, a choice between an idealized banana and an imperfect pear is no choice at all;
that is, comparing actual things with idealized alternatives is a false dichotomy, tipping the
scales in favor of the idealized choice. This “choice” has been termed the “nirvana fallacy.” See
Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1969).
64 VA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
65 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 63
(2002). Of course, theories of religious liberty can be traced back much further than this, but at
least with respect to the modern constitutional foundations of religious liberty, these docu-
ments provide salient examples of the political ideology with respect to religious liberty around
the time of the enactment of the Constitution.
66 Id. at 66.
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in democracies more generally, and the literature has been generally dominated by
“optimistic pluralists”67 who presume legislative actors to be reasonable pluralists,
passing legislation protective of religious liberty for the good of the general public.
Public choice theory calls into question this romanticized view of the relationship
between religion and politics.68 Instead, a public choice analysis suggests that legis-
lation protective of religious liberty is the consequence of an economic transaction
whereby religious interest groups demand protective legislation that is supplied by
legislators, whose primary concern is to secure the number of votes sufficient for
reelection.69 Legislation affording religious accommodations and exemptions, then,
arises from a subtle and complex process through which the suppliers (the legislators)
weigh the gains derived from the prospective transfer (votes gained) against the costs
borne (votes lost).
A. The Model
This Section proposes a simple deductive model of the religious marketplace to as-
sess the nature of religious accommodations and exemptions. The religious marketplace
model contains two tiers. The first tier is best termed the “adherent marketplace,” and
focuses on the social arena where churches and denominations act as religious firms
(i.e., produce and distribute religious goods) and compete for individual adherents—
that is, the first tier focuses on the interplay between individuals and religious firms.
The second tier will be referred to as the “policy marketplace,” and is concerned with
the relationship between the religious firms and government, whereby religious firms
compete for policy outcomes.
The two tiers are necessarily interrelated. At tier one, the religious firms attempt
to convince individuals that they can supply the ultimate religious good—a deep
spiritual connection to some supernatural force.70 However, religious firms need to
convince individuals to purchase their religious good (with, for example, financial
and time contributions). At tier two, religious firms seek regulation that assists them
in marketing their religious good to individuals. The policy is integral in a religious
firm’s efforts to retain or attract adherents. The focus of this Article is tier two, though
tier one will be briefly discussed.
67 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 276 (1988).
68 See GILL, supra note 7, at 7–8; Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty:
A Theoretical Outline, 1 INTERDISC. J. OF RES. ON RELIGION. 1 (2005); Anthony Gill,
Religion and Comparative Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 117 (2001). See generally JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975); FARBER
& FRICKEY, supra note 4; MAX STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009); Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 5.
69 See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed.
1974).
70 See discussion infra note 76.
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1. Tier One: Adherent Marketplace
Tier one is ultimately concerned with the relationship between individuals and
the religious firm. The fundamental task is to define the players and the playing
field.71 Therefore:
Adherent Definition 1: The adherent marketplace is the social
arena where religious firms compete for members.72
Adherent Definition 2: A religious firm is a church or denomi-
nation that produces and distributes religious goods.
Adherent Definition 3: Religious goods are, ultimately, the fun-
damental answers to philosophical questions having at base some
appeal to supernatural forces.
Religious firms, then, are suppliers, or sellers, of religious goods. Pursuant to the
maximization premise, religious firms are market optimizers, seeking to maximize
members, resources, government support, or any other determinant of institutional
success.73 Because a seller cannot long survive without a buyer, the core function of
the religious firm is to attract those individual buyers. Given that public choice assumes
that individuals are benefit maximizers, the model makes the following assumption:
Adherent Assumption 1: Individuals will act rationally, weighing
the costs and benefits of selecting any given religious firm, and
will choose the firm that maximizes their net benefit.
Adherent Premise 1: Costs and benefits include explicit and im-
plicit prices, e.g., income level, time availability, and geograph-
ical restrictions.74
There are many diverse rational choice models that seek to explain an individual’s
cost-benefit balancing.75 It is unnecessary to recite these options here. It is sufficient
for the purpose of this Article to simply assume that individuals are benefit maximizers
who will select the religious firm that best responds to their individual calculus, which
includes at least both financial and time constraints.
71 GILL, supra note 7, at 41.
72 Note that the notion of “competition” does not simply refer to proselytizing. Competing
could simply be a presence in the marketplace and the desire to practice in peace. The term
“compete for members” will be used to incorporate all of these senses.
73 Iannaccone, supra note 5, at 27.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 26–27.
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Similarly, religious firms are benefit maximizers:
Adherent Assumption 2: Religious firms are profit-maximizers,
with profit defined in terms of adherents.
To this end, religious firms seek the most efficient ways in which to attract individual
adherents. For the purposes of this Article, this can be stated thus:
Adherent Assumption 3: Governmental regulation represents an
efficient means by which religious firms can maximize the number
of adherents.
Adherent Assumption 4: Majority religious firms will seek high
levels of regulation over the religious marketplace (i.e., restrictions
on minority firms and high barriers to entry), whereas religious
minorities will prefer limited regulation (i.e., broader religious
liberty and low barriers to entry).
Adherent Assumptions 3 and 4 together claim that religious firms utilize regulation
as a central method for attracting and/or retaining individual adherents. Specifically,
Assumption 4 states that religious firms that hold a large stake of the religious market-
place (i.e., that have captured a portion of the market) prefer regulation that puts limits
on new entrants and minority firms. After all, if the ultimate goal of a religious firm is
adherent maximization, any firm with a sizable market share will be unlikely to pro-
mote regulation that could potentially diminish that share. Conversely, Assumption 4
assumes minority religious firms will seek regulation that broadly favors religious
liberty and allows for easy access to the religious market. Ultimately, then, the model
assumes the following:
Adherent Assumption 5: The degree of religious liberty is depen-
dent on the composition of the religious market. A highly plural-
istic market will result in a high degree of religious liberty. A
religious market that is captured by one or a few religious firms
will result in a low degree of religious liberty.
2. Tier Two: Policy Marketplace
Tier two is ultimately concerned with the relationship between religious firms
and government:
Policy Definition 1: The policy marketplace is the regulatory arena
where religious firms compete for favorable regulation.76
76 Even if the religion is non-proselytizing, it will still seek favorable regulation. For
example, Judaism is a non-proselytizing religion that does not actively (or perhaps openly)
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Policy Definition 2: Favorable regulation describes both offen-
sive legislation (favorable exemptions and accommodations from
generally applicable laws) and defensive regulation (defeating
competing legislative proposals or at least achieving restrictions
on competing legislative proposals).
Policy Axiom 1: Religious firms compete in the policy marketplace
through religious interest groups (“RIGs”).
Policy Axiom 2: Government is represented in the policy market-
place by individual legislators.
The above definitions and axioms establish a policy market that involves two
political actors: RIGs and legislators. The critical task is to identify the interests of
the political actors. The general assumption as to interests can be stated thus:
Policy Assumption 1: Political actors behave rationally, weighing
the costs and benefits of potential political actions and choosing
those actions that maximize their expected net benefits.
This is a broad assumption and it is generically applicable to political actors.
However, for the purposes of this model, the assumption needs refinement in order
to accurately describe the interests of each individual actor. The specific interest
assumption, and consequent premise, for the legislator can be stated as follows:
Policy Assumption L1: Legislators are primarily interested in
their personal political survival (i.e., reelection).
Policy Premise L1: Legislators enact legislation protective of
religious liberty when they believe that it will increase the prob-
ability of reelection.
Policy Assumption L1 is the baseline assumption of public choice theory and
envisages legislators as “single-minded seekers of reelection.”77 Put another way,
compete for members in the public square; however, there are numerous interest groups rep-
resenting the interests of Judaism in the governmental arena, such as the American Jewish
Committee or the American Jewish Congress.
77 MAYHEW, supra note 69, at 5; see also MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF
THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); Eskridge, supra note 67, at 288. But see,
RICHARD F. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973) (arguing that legislators have
three goals: reelection, prestige within the legislature, and a desire to contribute to policy
debates constructively).
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Policy Assumption L1 characterizes reelection as legislators’ ultimate preference.
The primacy of the reelection goal does not deny that legislators can be motivated by
ideational goals (e.g., public good, religious belief); rather, it acknowledges the simple
truism that reelection must be the proximate goal of every legislator because, without
reelection, all other goals are largely unachievable.78 Because reelection is so important,
legislators must act to maximize its probability. This maximizing assumption is what
distinguishes prior normative scholarship on legislative outcomes from public choice
analyses of the same outcomes. By focusing on reelection as the ultimate preference
of each individual legislator, public choice enables a direct focus on each individual
responsible for passing or denying legislation protective of religious liberty, and goes
some distance in explaining why legislators would choose to curtail legislative power
by providing accommodations and exemptions.
Policy Premise L1 is a statement of belief: in order for each legislator to satisfy her
preference for reelection, she must act on a belief that a given action will maximize
the probability of that preference. Specifically, Policy Premise L1 states that the legis-
lator will enact legislation protective of religious liberty when she believes it will lead
to reelection. As discussed below, the model assumes that religious accommodation
statutes are supplied in response to RIG demand. Policy Premise L1, then, builds in
a presumption that RIGs are sufficiently influential in the general voting community
such that a RIG can generate an increase in votes sufficient to increase the probability
of reelection.
The specific interest assumption and consequent premise for the RIG is:
Policy Assumption RIG1: Religious interest groups form political
coalitions when the benefits from achieving wealth transfers from
the legislature outweigh the costs of organizing and lobbying.
Premise RIG1: Religious interest groups seek legislation that maxi-
mizes their utility.
Policy Assumption RIG1 is a fundamental premise of public choice theory.79 This
assumption simply states that interest groups formally organize into selective political
lobbying groups when the benefits of organizing outweigh the costs of organizing.
78 MAYHEW, supra note 69, at 16–17. Note that although Assumption L1 assumes that
politicians want to be reelected, it does not limit the motivations for this desire to “goals
achievement”; for example, the legislator could desire reelection for money, power, or fame.
The presumption is, however, that all of these things are unachievable if the legislator is not
in office.
79 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 6, 125–26 (1965); Elhauge, supra note 10, at 32–44; Eskridge, supra
note 67, at 285–89; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
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Interest group theory specifies that formally organized groups that are “willing to
spend money to obtain or block the passage of legislation will tend to monopolize the
attention of the legislator, at the expense” of both the general public welfare and less
organized groups.80 Further, public choice theory argues that interest groups are likely
to have focused interests in order to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs to
themselves. Narrowly targeted legislative goals ensure that the legislative benefits are,
wherever possible, divisible and excludable, minimizing any “free riders.”81
Cost minimization is the raison d’être for interest group lobbying of the legislature
for targeted legislation: the interest group gains the benefit and the cost is broadly dis-
bursed across the general public through consolidated revenue.82 The interest group is
unlikely to face significant opposition to the cost because of its wide disbursement;
assuming all political actors act rationally, the cost of organizing to oppose the interest
group is irrational. RIGs, then, organize around specific issues that are of the most
benefit to their interests, avoiding, wherever possible, the possibility of other RIGs
free riding on their lobbying efforts.83
Policy Premise RIG1 states that RIGs will demand rent-seeking legislation that
maximizes their utility. Utility preferences for RIGs will vary depending on market
conditions;84 however, it is possible to generalize RIGs as preferring legislation that
indirectly maintains or increases the number of adherents to the religion that the RIG
represents, as well as legislation that directs maximum financial gain to that religion
(e.g., exemption from general taxation laws).85
Although it is acknowledged that rent-seeking statutes can serve a legitimate end
apart from the redistributive calculus of the RIG86—and further, that it can be difficult
80 Eskridge, supra note 67, at 286–87.
81 Free riders are groups or individuals who would benefit from certain legislation, but
that do not contribute to the effort. Id.; see also FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 137–41 (1997); STEARNS &
ZYWICKI, supra note 68, at 14–15; Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 1145–48.
82 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 68, at 251.
83 See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS 99–126 (1981); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 332–
37  (1973).
84 See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
85 There is growing literature on the notion of a “religious market.” See, e.g., JOHN
ANDERSON, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION
(2003); ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776–2005:
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY (2005); GILL, supra note 7; CHARLES
HANSON, NECESSARY VIRTUE: THE PRAGMATIC ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NEW
ENGLAND (1998); RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND RELIGION (Lawrence A. Young ed.,
1997); Roger Finke, Religious Deregulation: Origins and Consequences, 32 J. CHURCH & ST.
609 (1990); Roger Finke & Laurence R. Iannaccone, Supply-Side Explanations for Religious
Change, 527 ANNALS 27 (1993) Anthony Gill, The Economics of Evangelization, in RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND EVANGELIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 70–84 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1999);
cf. STEVE BRUCE, CHOICE & RELIGION: A CRITIQUE OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1999).
86 See, Macey, supra note 11, at 508; Vestal, supra note 3, at 347.
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to distinguish between “‘amorally redistributive’ rent seeking” and “wealth-increasing
‘public interest’ governmental activities”87—to ensure a simple and effective predic-
tive model, and in keeping with public choice modeling more generally, it is necessary
to assume these issues away.88
In reality, the legislation that RIGs will demand, and the legislation that the leg-
islator will supply, is dependent on the condition of the market in which the political
actors operate.
The rational legislator will act to reduce restrictions on religious liberty only
when it maximizes the probability that she will be reelected. That is:
Policy Assumption L2: To the extent that political survival is hin-
dered by restrictions on religious liberty, religious restrictions will
be liberalized (i.e., when there is high opportunity cost of reli-
gious restrictions, deregulation of the religious market will result).
Conversely, restrictions on religious liberty will increase if it in-
creases the chance of political survival.89
The market conditions under which the legislator operates depend on the nature
of the religious marketplace. Therefore:
Policy Assumption RIG2: All RIGs are not equivalent and RIGs
separately represent majority religious firms (“MARIG”), and
minority religious firms (“MIRIG”).
Policy Axiom 3: MARIG can refer to one dominant religious firm
and representative interest group or one of a small number of dom-
inant religious firms (holding a significant market share) and rep-
resentative interest groups.
Policy Assumption RIG3: Assuming some level of religious free-
dom, whereas religious liberty represents the degree to which a
government regulates the religious marketplace, hegemonic reli-
gions will prefer targeted beneficial laws and high levels of gov-
ernment regulation over religious minorities. Religious minorities
will prefer generalized laws favoring greater religious liberty.90
Whereas Policy Assumption RIG1 outlined that RIGs are benefit maximizers,
Policy Assumptions RIG2 and RIG3 state that there is diversity between RIGs (driven
87 Vestal, supra note 3, at 348.
88 Macey, supra note 11, at 472–73.
89 The characterization of this assumption derives from GILL, supra note 7, at 232.
90 Id.
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by the religious firm that they represent) and, consequently, the nature of the benefit
being sought from the legislator. Assumption RIG2 makes a simple division between
majority religious firms (and their RIGs) and minority religious firms (and their RIGs)
and specifies that the utility of the RIG is dependent on whether it is characterized as
majority or minority within any religious marketplace. Given that RIGs are benefit
maximizers, it would be expected that utility will align with current market share.
Therefore, a MARIG, although perhaps rhetorically in favor of freedom of reli-
gious liberty, would favor the status quo (whatever that may be), or perhaps lobby for
narrowly tailored marginal positive shifts from the status quo, as well as seeking laws
that keep the barriers to entry into the religious marketplace high (for example, by
imposing zoning restrictions on minority churches, or restricting visas on foreign
missionaries).91 A MIRIG, on the other hand, would seek broad religious freedom,
enabling regulation-free proselytizing, the ability to build churches, and the ability to
access governmental grants (albeit within the limits of any constitutional establish-
ment clause).92 Importantly, a MIRIG that is aware of its market position will also seek
to broaden the scope of any MARIG lobbying to include religious groups generally
(either by independent lobbying appealing to the legislator’s utility probability or by
free riding).
Policy Assumption L2 responds to these market conditions and suggests that a
legislator will carefully weigh the costs and benefits in terms of reelection by exam-
ining the religious marketplace as a whole. This assumption states that when there is
a strong religious majority operating on the religious market, a rational legislator is
likely to be less responsive to religious minority demands for broader religious liberty
up to the point of utility maximization.
B. Predictive Results
Taking the model on its terms, with political players maximizing their self-interest,
what type of results should such a system generate? There are two dimensions to the
91 This distinction is suggested, although not modeled by GILL, supra note 7, at 44–45.
To buttress his claim that religious groups act differently depending on their position in the
“religious market,” Gill provides the example of the Catholic Church. For Gill, if the Catholic
Church was preferencing morality, or spirituality, its policy would remain consistent across
nations. Id. at 45–46. Gill examines the policy of the Church in Latin America, where the
Catholic Church has been dominant for over five centuries, and in post-Soviet Russia, where
the Church is an expanding denomination. Id. at 45. He finds that in Latin America, the Church
has actively sought restrictions on evangelical and Pentecostal religions, whereas in Russia,
the Church has been pressing for greater religious liberty and access to the religious market. Id.
Gill claims that this behavior on the part of the Catholic Church is indicative of interest-based,
rather than ideational, behavior whereby the Church’s policy is determined by market position
rather than some theological precept. See id. at 45–46. On the notion of a religious market, see
generally, Gill, supra note 85.
92 See supra notes 16–26 and accompanying text.
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answer: the first involving the process by which the legislation is enacted, and the
second involving the substance of the legislation produced.93
1. Predicted Legislative Process
The process dimension involves examining the flow of value to the legislators
who assisted in the enactment of the statute providing religious accommodations or
exempting religious actors from generally applicable laws.94 The legislator’s willing-
ness to supply the legislation is dependent on the legislator’s belief that the legislation
lobbied for by the RIGs will in fact maximize, or at least increase, the probability that
the legislator will be reelected.
In order to maximize her opportunity for reelection, the legislator is faced with
a number of choices when a RIG presents RIG-beneficial legislation. First, the leg-
islator faces the “dilemma of the ungrateful electorate,” in which the positive things
the legislator does for an interest group are more easily forgotten than any negative
action95—that is, refusing the RIG is likely to decrease the probability of reelection.
Conversely, the legislator will be aware of countervailing interests in the electorate
(either from another RIG or the public more generally), which have significant poten-
tial to inversely affect the legislator’s utility.
To avoid this dilemma, and to universally maximize votes, the legislator will typi-
cally attempt to help the group that will attract the most votes for the legislator, as
well as the least attention of the legislator’s other constituents. The legislator will
attempt to avoid divisive issues while maximizing votes by finessing or avoiding con-
flicting demands, either by doing “casework” (whereby the legislator assists “harmed”
constituents on an individual basis) or by pork barreling (whereby the legislator gives
“tangibles” to buy off the constituents).96
When it is impossible to avoid the conflicting demands of the RIGs, once the cost
is measured against the benefits in terms of votes, the legislator will attempt to satisfy
all groups by supporting “compromise legislation.”97 When this is impossible, the legis-
lator will likely support an ambiguous law in which the statute is drafted in broad terms,
with the details to be filled in by the courts or regulatory agencies. In this way, the legis-
lator can reassure each RIG it has won, and can pass the blame to the courts or admin-
istration if the outcomes belie the promises made.98 Thus, the legislator maximizes the
probability of her reelection by calculating the votes gained versus votes lost for each
religiously protective legislative action.
93 See Vestal, supra note 3, at 347.
94 Eskridge, supra note 67, at 287–88; Vestal, supra note 3, at 349.
95 Eskridge, supra note 67, at 287–88.
96 Id.
97 Compromise legislation is legislation that substantially meets the utility of the lobbying
RIG, as well as balances the needs of the countervailing RIGs or the community more generally.
98 Eskridge, supra note 67, at 287–88.
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2. Predicted Legislative Outcomes
On the whole, the substance dimension of the model predicts that we would expect
to see rent-seeking statutes that overwhelmingly benefit MARIGs. Given that MARIGs
presumably have the greatest potential to maximize the legislators’ utility, it seems
likely that this power advantage will systematically yield laws that are beneficial for
MARIGs. Examples of laws that benefit MARIGs include exemptions from generally
applicable laws that increase the wealth and availability of MARIGs to the populace.
However, as outlined in the above section, in deciding whether to enact the legislation
lobbied for by MARIGs, the legislator must weigh the votes lost against the votes
gained if she were to enact the statute. Hence, it would be expected that outcomes
would include legislative compromises, such as applying the MARIG-desired legis-
lation more broadly to religious firms in general. Additionally, we would expect that
broadly applicable legislation passing responsibility to the courts and the administra-
tive branch would emanate from the legislature.
Further, given the utility demands of MARIGs and the power of MARIGs to maxi-
mize the legislator’s utility, expected outcomes would also include monopolistic
legislation whereby MARIGs intentionally seek to limit access to—and competition
in—the religious marketplace. Examples include statutes imposing restrictions on
which firms qualify as “religious firms” under beneficial legislation and statutes re-
quiring permission for religiously motivated practices.
The expected result under the model, then, is that “the legislature will produce too
few laws that serve truly public ends, and too many laws that serve private ends.”99
Generally, it is expected that there will be statutes serving majority religious welfare
over the interests of minority religions, secular interests, or the public more generally.
C. Case Study
As noted above, a rigorous application of the model is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, it is worthwhile to briefly review the model vis-à-vis some of the
more significant accommodations and exemptions for religion on the statute books.
Because even the most preliminary application is impossible without at least a basic
overview of a sample of statutory accommodations and exemptions, what follows is a
capsule overview of a sample of statutory accommodations and exemptions in five
key policy areas: social security, taxation, conscientious objection, indigenous religious
freedom, and employment discrimination. There is no blind selection means by which
to select topical genres for this kind of case study; therefore, the five genres were drawn
from leading Supreme Court religion clause cases. These policy areas represent the five
topics most regularly litigated in religion clause cases before the Supreme Court.
This approach does, of course, attract the criticism that it cherry-picks legislation
that demonstrates the effectiveness of the model. The most that can be said in response
99 Id. at 277.
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to this concern is that this Section presents preliminary observations as to the possible
applicability of a public choice analysis. Future work will provide a detailed appli-
cation of the model. For now, these observations serve to demonstrate that a public
choice theory is plausible as a descriptor for the existence of religious accommo-
dations and exemptions.
First, a note: the case study draws on legislation both pre- and post-Smith. The
Supreme Court’s protectionist period lasted from 1963 to 1990; that is, accommoda-
tions and exemptions were only constitutionally required under the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Free Exercise Clause between these dates.100 All but one of the examples
in the case study fall outside this protectionist period; in other words, there was no
“judicial overhang”101 to which the passage of the legislation can be attributed. Further,
the sole statute that falls within this period, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was tabled
prior to the 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner.102 Finally, even if legislation in the
case study fell within the Court’s protectionist period, it would be difficult to con-
clude that it was passed because of the Court’s protectionist doctrine. Given that the
legislature demonstrated its competence and willingness to enact accommodations
and exemptions prior to the statement of constitutional mandate to do so, any example
of legislative action falling within the constitutionally protectionist period—when not
judicially ordered—is simply correlation, not causation.103
1. Conscientious Objectors
Almost from Federation, the U.S. legislature took up the issue of exemptions
from military service on the basis of religious conscientious objection.104 At the First
Congress, James Madison offered up a list of Amendments to the Constitution, includ-
ing the following:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best
100 See supra notes 19–35 and accompanying text.
101 This term was coined by Mark Tushnet to describe constitutional arrangements by which
the possibility of judicial review may necessitate rights-positive actions by the legislature.
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–58 (1999).
102 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000), was introduced on June 11, 1963.
The Sherbert decision was handed down on June 17, 1963. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1962); see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972 132–34 (1990).
103 An illustrative metaphor is a situation in which a child is instructed by her parents to prac-
tice the piano for one hour every day. The child practices for six hours every day. If her parents
reduce the requirement to a half hour every day, given her previously held commitment beyond
the minimum requirement, it is arguable that there is no concern that she will cease to practice.
Thanks are due to Jacob Gersen for this helpful metaphor.
104 See S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1789); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1817–18 (1790).
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security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous
of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in
person.105
The proposed exemption was ultimately excluded from the now Second
Amendment because Congress determined that the matter was more appropriately
left to the state governments.106 It was not until the Civil War that the first national
draft was introduced, and although the conscription bill did not mention consci-
entious objection per se, it did enable a drafted religious objector to provide an accept-
able substitute or pay $300 to hire a substitute.107 One year later, in response to concerns
of Quakers that payment for a substitute was equivalent to military service, Congress
amended the law so that religious objectors—defined as those forbidden by their
denominations’ articles of faith from bearing arms—would be designated non-
combatants and assigned to appropriate duties, and objectors would be obliged to
pay $300 for “the benefit of the sick and wounded soldiers.”108
Subsequent national conscription laws contained increasingly more permissive
accommodations for religious objectors. The World War I conscription law109 in-
cluded an exemption from military service (and an obligation to perform non-combatant
duties) for members of “any well-recognized religious sect or organization at . . . whose
existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form . . . .”110
Following derision from members of Congress who protested the limitation of ob-
jectors to members of recognized sects or organizations, President Wilson expanded
105 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
106 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1821–22 (1790). Notably, many state legislatures had already
enacted, or subsequently enacted, conscientious objector protections; for example, Rhode
Island, North Carolina, and Massachusetts. See Richard Wilson Renner, Conscientious
Objection and the Federal Government, 1787–1792, 38 MIL. AFF. 142 (Dec., 1974). On the
early history of conscientious objectors, see, for example, GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at
ch. 4; CHARLES C. MOSKOS, A CALL TO CIVIC SERVICE: NATIONAL SERVICE FOR COUNTRY
AND COMMUNITY (1988); Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1069, 1112–15 (1998); Charles C. Moskos, Conscientious Objectors, in A HISTORY OF
NATIONAL SERVICE IN AMERICA (Peter Shapiro ed., 1994).
107 Enrollment Act of 1863,ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731, 733 (1863). For the congressional debate
over the inclusion of an exemption that would satisfy the Quakers and Shakers, see CONG.
GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 994 (1863).
108 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9 (1864). On conscientious objectors in the
Civil War, see, for example, EDWARD NEEDLES WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE
CIVIL WAR, 6 (1931).
109 National Defense Act, ch. 134, § 59, 39 Stat. 166, 197 (1916).
110 Selective Draft Act, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917) (enabling the President to set the
conditions for any religious exemption). This Act amended the National Defense Act, which
was more restrictive. Id.; see National Defense Act § 59.
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the definition of objectors to include those “who profess religious or other conscien-
tious scruples,” regardless of whether they belonged to a sect or organization.111
Interestingly, the recognized sect or organization limitation was also challenged
in the Supreme Court as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.112 The Court held that
“we pass without anything but statement [on] the proposition that” the provision in-
fringed the religion clauses, “because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to
require us to do more.”113 Additionally, in a subsequent 1931 Supreme Court challenge
to the draft laws, the Court held that “whether any citizen shall be exempt from serving
in the armed forces of the Nation in time of war is dependent upon the will of Congress
and not upon the scruples of the individual, except as Congress provides.”114
The expanded Executive definition of conscientious objector carried over to the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which exempted any person who “by
reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war
in any form.”115 The Act also enabled objectors to elect to perform non-arms bearing
military service or alternate civilian service.116 Following considerable debate over the
meaning of “[r]eligious training and belief,” Congress defined the phrase in the 1948
Selective Service Act as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involv-
ing duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essen-
tially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”117
111 Exec. Order No. 2,823 (Mar. 20, 1918), in 18 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8475, 8476 (James D. Richardson ed., 1921). For commentary on
President Wilson’s executive order, see FISHER, supra note 39, at 91–96; MULFORD Q.
SIBLEY & PHILIP E. JACOBS, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE: THE AMERICAN STATE AND THE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, 1940–1947 12–14 (1952); Comment, The Legal Relationship of
Conscience to Religion: Refusals to Bear Arms, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 583, 586–87 (1971). See
generally LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE EXPERIENCES OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN AMERICA THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR (Peter Brock ed., 2002)
(detailing an early history of conscientious objectors in America).
112 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
113 Id. at 389–90.
114 United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931), overruled by Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
115 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889 (1940). On
the pressure that religious groups exerted on Congress to exclude a membership requirement,
see, e.g., JULIEN CORNELL, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR AND THE LAW, ch. 1 (1943);
FISHER, supra note 39, at ch. 4.
116 § 5(g), 54 Stat. at 889. On civilian public service, see, for example, HEATHER T. FRAZER
& JOHN O’SULLIVAN, “WE HAVE JUST BEGUN TO NOT FIGHT”: AN ORAL HISTORY OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN CIVILIAN PUBLIC SERVICE DURING WORLD WAR II (1996).
117 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 624, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 613 (1948). The phrase ap-
parently mimicked the Ninth Circuit Court’s interpretation of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940 in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946) (en banc) cert. denied,
329 U.S. 795, which limited exemptions from service conscientious beliefs “based upon an
individual’s belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly one.” Id.
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Subsequent challenges to the meaning of “religious training and belief” propelled
Congress to remove the requirement that an objector demonstrate a belief in a Supreme
Being.118 As the law currently stands, a person who conscientiously opposes “war in
any form,” “by reason of religious training and belief,” will not be subject to combat-
ant training.119 There is no requirement that objectors demonstrate a belief in a Supreme
Being or belong to a religious sect. The President can assign objectors to non-combatant
roles, and those objectors who are opposed to non-combatant roles can be assigned by
the President to “such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
health, safety, or interest” as the Director of Selective Service deems appropriate.120 The
law is silent on selective conscientious objectors—that is, objection to a particular war,
rather than war generally—and the Supreme Court has rejected a reading of the statute
that would enable selective objection.121
2. Income Tax
From the date of the enactment of federal income tax—contained in the Tariff
Act of 1894—accommodations for religious organizations have existed.122 Following
a constitutional skirmish between the Supreme Court and Congress as to the congres-
sional power to lay and collect taxes and the subsequent adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment,123 Congress’s scheme of income taxation stipulated that the income tax
provisions did not apply to any association or corporation “organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”124 Subsequent
118 The phrase was most famously challenged in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
165 (1965), which was in fact a combination of three appeals from circuit courts on the consti-
tutionality of the draft laws. The circuit court decisions were: United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d
846 (2d Cir. 1964), Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), and United States v.
Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Note that the requirement of belief in a “Supreme Being” was removed by Congress in 1967.
See Universal Military Training and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100, 104 (1967).
119 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2006).
120 Id.
121 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439–41 (1971). See generally Kent Greenawalt,
All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 SUP. CT. REV.
31, 31–94 (1971); Charles J. Reid, Jr., John T. Noonan, Jr., on the Catholic Conscience and
War: Negre v. Larsen, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881 (2001).
122 Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894).
123 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (empowering Congress to lay and collect taxes without
apportionment among the states); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586
(1895), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (striking down the law
as unconstitutional). On the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, see, for example, Erik M.
Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1057, 1107–19 (2001).
124 Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913).
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income taxing legislation, including the War Revenue Act of 1917 and 1918 revenue
raising law, also exempted religious associations and corporations maintained for
religious purposes.125
Within the current Internal Revenue Code (the Code), there are numerous other dis-
tinctions based on religion and the nature of a religious organization. Charles Whelan
has identified almost twenty distinctions, including “churches, their integrated aux-
iliaries, and conventions or associations of churches,” “religious purposes,” “religious
order,” and “exclusively religious activities of any religious order.”126 The exemption
from income tax currently appears in section 501(c)(3) of the Code, stipulating that
organizations “organized and operated” for “religious . . . purposes” are exempt from
liability for income tax.127 The provision in full provides an exemption for:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, or-
ganized and operated exclusively for religious . . . purposes . . . no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to in-
fluence legislation . . . and which does not participate in, or inter-
vene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements),
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any can-
didate for public office.128
The various restrictions in section 501(c)(3) were added sporadically to the
original exemption. For example, the “inures to the benefit” preclusion was adopted
in 1909 pursuant to the Tariff of 1909,129 the restriction against political activities
was added in 1934,130 and the political campaigning restriction was added in 1954.131
Further, a “church” (including a mosque or a synagogue)132 meeting the requirements
125  Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 231(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1076 (1919); War Revenue Act,
ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
126 Charles M. Whelan, “Church” in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 887–90 (1977); see also Terry L. Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar:
Defining “Religion” for Purposes of Administering Religion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 219, 242 (1983).
127 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
128 Id.
129 Ch. 6, §38, 36 Stat. 11, 113 (1909).
130 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §101(6), 48 Stat. 680, 700 (1934).
131 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 201(c)(1), 68A Stat. 163 (1954).
132 The IRS notes that the term “church” is not defined; it is used by the IRS in a generic sense
to mean places of worship, including mosques and synagogues. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUB. NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: BENEFITS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE FEDERAL TAX LAW 2 (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf
/p1828.pdf.
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of section 501(c)(3) is automatically considered tax exempt, and is not required to
apply for recognition from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).133 Religious organi-
zations, however, must apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status when their gross annual
receipts normally exceed $5,000.134 Notably, a considerable restriction on the scope of
the exemption for churches and religious organizations exists under sections 511–514
of the Code, which subjects unrelated business income to taxation; unrelated income
is income derived from a trading or business activity regularly carried on and unrelated
to the organization’s exempt purpose.135 The IRS notes that the fact that “the organiza-
tion uses the income to further its charitable or religious purposes does not make the
activity substantially related to its exempt purposes.”136
Once an organization is exempt, it can also qualify for exemptions from state and
local income tax, as well as other taxation exemptions and benefits, including: property
tax, preferential postal rates, and exemptions under the Federal Employment Tax Act.137
A significant related benefit is the deductibility from the income tax of donors for con-
tributions made to an exempt church or religious organization, including: hospitals,
medical research foundations, and educational institutions138 This deduction was en-
acted in 1917 and remains unaltered.139
3. Employment Discrimination
The U.S. has comprehensive federal laws prohibiting employers from discriminat-
ing against persons for employment purposes based on race, sex, color, religion, or na-
tional origin.140 However, since the inception of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Congress
has provided for an exemption from these anti-discrimination provisions for both
religious organizations and religious educational institutions.141 Enacted to alleviate
concerns that the Civil Rights Act would enable Congress to regulate the employment
133 Id. at 3.
134 Id.
135 I.R.C. §§ 511–514 (2000); see Nina J. Crimm, Shortcomings in America’s Federal Tax
Regulatory Regime of Private Foundations: Insights for Australia, 31 AUSTL. TAX REV. 90,
97 n.57 (2002).
136 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 132, at 12.
137 Slye, supra note 126, at 220.
138 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2000). Contributions are deductible to the extent that the aggre-
gate of the contributions does not exceed fifty percent of the donor’s adjusted tax base in the
case of contributions to a church, or twenty percent in the case of contributions to a religious
organization. Id. at §§ 170(b)(1)(A), (D).
139 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
140 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
141 Id. § 2000e-2(e) (stating that the exemption applies when the educational institution
is “in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular
religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum
of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning
is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion”).
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practices of churches,142 the exemption, as originally passed, allowed religious orga-
nizations to discriminate on the basis of religion in relation to employment decisions
that would affect religious activities. The original exemption specified that:
This title shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association,
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a par-
ticular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities
or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of
individuals to perform work connected with the educational activ-
ities of such institution.143
However, for many members of Congress, the exemption was insufficient to pro-
tect the needs of religious organizations and, in 1972, the Act was amended to provide
that religious organizations and educational institutions could discriminate on the basis
of religion in relation to all activities of the organization.144 As amended, the exemption
specifies that the prohibition against employment discrimination:
. . . shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities.145
Although ambiguities remain—for example, whether the exemption applies to
commercial activities of religious institutions or to for-profit activities—the exemp-
tion itself is a solid example of Congress providing for religious free exercise beyond
what is constitutionally required. The breadth of the exemption withstood Supreme
Court scrutiny in 1987 when a non-religious employee of a not-for-profit facility of
the Mormon Church was discharged for not being a member of that Church.146 The
Court implicitly held that any interference with the employment decisions of the Church
would infringe its free exercise of religion, and Congress’s decision to accord religion
142 See Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983); see
also Scott D. McClure, Note, Religious Preferences in Employment Decisions: How Far May
Religious Organizations Go?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 587, 592 (1990).
143 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964), amended
by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (2000).
144 See McClure, supra note 142, at 592 (providing the history of the amendment and a
detailed examination of the exemption).
145 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
146 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1987).
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a broad exemption from laws of general application was accepted as legitimate by
the Court.147
4. Indigenous Religious Freedom
It seems almost contradictory to the purpose of this Article—to demonstrate the
superiority of legislative protection of religious freedom over judicial protection—
to include a section on indigenous religious freedom. The protection of the native peo-
ples and their religion has, until recent times, been lax at best.148 The European settlers
attempted to “civilize” the indigenous people and inculcate them with Christianity, with
no regard for traditional beliefs.149 However, in recent times, the legislative and execu-
tive branches have expanded the protection of indigenous religious rights, contrary to
the persistent limitations on those rights imposed by the judiciary.150
The early Americans did not value the equality of Native American religion. As
early as 1606, the American colonies legislated to propagate Christianity among
American Indians.151 The first united Congress, the Continental Congress, resolved on
February 5, 1776, that persons would be selected to live amongst the Native Americans
and “instruct them in the Christian religion.”152 It was not until 1962 that Congress
acted to pass the first statute, in what would become a series of legislation, protecting
Native American religious freedom.153 The first Act of Congress protecting the reli-
gious rights of Native Americans was an extension of the 1940 law protecting the bald
eagle.154 Although the original legislation did not refer to a need to protect the religious
147 See GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at 383–84.
148 FISHER, supra note 39, at 147.
149 Id.
150 This does not purport to be a comprehensive overview of the history of Native American
religion. For a comprehensive history of the protection (or lack of) of the religious freedom of
American Indians, see FISHER, supra note 39, at 147.
151 The Virginia Charter of 1606 specified that colonists were to be active in “propagating
of Christian Religion to such People . . . and may in time bring the Infidels and Savages,
living in those parts, to human Civility.” THE FIRST VIRGINIA CHARTER, 1606, reprinted in 7
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HEREFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3783, 3784 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); see also THE CHARTER
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 1629, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES NOW OR HEREFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1846, 1846
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). See generally R. PIERCE BEAVER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
THE AMERICAN (1983); R. PIERCE BEAVER, INTRODUCTION TO NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH
HISTORY (Rev. David Keller ed., 1983); R. Pierce Beaver, Church, State, and the Indians:
Indian Missions in the New Nation, 4 J. CHURCH & STATE 11 (1962).
152 4 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 111 (1906).
153 Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, § 2, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962).
154 Bald Eagle Protect Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940).
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freedom of Native Americans,155 the 1962 legislation extending the protection to the
golden eagle referred to the prominent place of the eagle in Native American
religions.156 Further, the legislation enabled the Secretary of the Interior to tempo-
rarily remove the protections for various grounds, including “the religious purposes
of Indian tribes.”157
The second important piece of protective legislation was an act, passed in 1970,
that granted the Pueblo de Taos Indians in New Mexico trust title to over 48,000 acres
of federal land, taken by presidential order in 1906 without any compensation.158
Although Congress had granted a fifty-year permit for the Taos Indians to use the
area for sacred purposes,159 the Taos petitioned the legislature for a “more permanent
arrangement in 1933.”160 In enacting the law passing trust title to the Native Americans,
Senator George McGovern stated:
What . . . is involved here is a deeply spiritual and religious matter,
which goes right to the heart of freedom of religion and freedom of
conscience in our country, because the . . . area which is in dispute,
and which has been in dispute for so many years, is regarded as the
most sacred of all places by the Indian people . . . .161
Subsequently, in 1978, Congress enacted the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act (AIRFA), specifying that religious freedom is an “inherent right” for all Americans
and “fundamental to the democratic structure[s] of the United States.”162 Congress
explicitly stated that Native American religion is one of the many diverse religions
in the United States and, in light of past breaches of the religious freedom of Native
Americans, it was necessary to pass legislation enshrining the protection and preser-
vation “for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions . . . including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials
and traditional rites.”163
Unfortunately, judicial enforcement of the Act has been weak, and since 1980 there
have been significant rejections of Native American claims of infringements on their
religious liberty by the judiciary. The most prominent of these is the Supreme Court’s
1988 decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association,164 in
155 H.R. REP. NO. 2104, at 1–2 (1940); 86 CONG. REC. 6446–47, 7006–07 (1940).
156 H.R. REP. NO. 1450, at 1–2 (1962).
157 Golden Eagle Protection Act § 2.
158 Act of Dec. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970).
159 Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, § 4, 48 Stat. 108, 109 (1933).
160 FISHER, supra note 39, at 167.
161 116 CONG. REC. 39331 (1970).
162 American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978).
163 Id.
164 485 U.S. 439 (1998).
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which the Court held that the federal government did not breach AIRFA or the Free
Exercise Clause by constructing a road near an Indian sacred site.165 The Court held
that the government had selected the least intrusive route, and that “government
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs
and desires.”166
More recently, Congress has enacted legislation to “protect Native American burial
sites and the removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects
of cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands.”167 The 1990
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act168 requires persons seeking
to undertake archeological digs or excavation work on federal lands to obtain a permit,
and enables Native American tribes to reclaim any remains located at the sites.169
Further, the Act protects Indian religious and cultural symbols by providing for criminal
sanctions for any person trafficking in artifacts or Indian human remains.170
5. Social Security
In 1935, in response to the economic crisis of the Great Depression, Congress
passed the nation’s first comprehensive social security legislation—the Social Security
Act.171 Under the original Act, Congress provided insurance for those who had been
employed in industry and commerce. The scheme was funded through taxation, or
premium payments of workers, who were then eligible to receive those payments
upon attaining the age of 65, becoming widowed, or becoming disabled.172
Following a series of major amendments in the 1950s, the insurance was extended
in 1954 to cover self-employed farm operators, thereby bringing the government’s leg-
islation into conflict with the beliefs of the Amish people.173 The Amish people, though
not opposed to taxation, are opposed to commercial insurance. The Amish believe that
insurance is a worldly operation and an indication of a lack of trust in God.174
During the ongoing conflict between the Amish and the IRS, the Amish and their
supporters lobbied the democratic branches for an exemption from the Social Security
165 Id. at 447.
166 Id. at 452.
167 H.R. REP. NO. 101–877, at 8 (1990).
168 Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990).
169 Id. at § 3.
170 Id. at § 4.
171 Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1934). Note that although the 1935 Social
Security Act was the first comprehensive, generally applicable social security law, there existed
targeted predecessors. On this point, see Social Security Online, Historical Background and
Development of Social Security, http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2011).
172 Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1934).
173 Brad Igou, Valentine Byler v. the IRS, Pay Unto Caesar—The Amish & Social
Security, AMISH COUNTRY NEWS (July 1, 2007), http://www.amishnews.com/amisharticles
/amishss.htm.
174 Id.
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provisions.175 Congress responded with an accommodation in 1965, which exempted
the Amish and any other members of a religious organization who objected to the gov-
ernment insurance scheme from payment of social security tax.176 The exemption ap-
plied to individuals rather than religious groups because, as the House Ways and Means
Committee specified, exclusion of a group in its entirety “would not take account of
the variances in individual beliefs within any religious group, and would deny social
security protection to those individuals who want it.”177
The exemption was tested before the Supreme Court in 1982, when the federal
government challenged the failure of an Amish employer to pay social security for
Amish employees.178 The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of statutory interpre-
tation, the exemption applied only to self-employed farmers and not to their Amish
employees.179 The Court held that the government had a compelling interest in lim-
iting the exemption to self-employed individuals because the taxation and social
security system depended on universal participation, and allowing for voluntary par-
ticipation would be a “contradiction in terms.”180 “The Court exaggerated the problem
in [a number of] ways,” including failing to recognize both the limited number of per-
sons who would ultimately claim the exemption and that the Amish did not object to
taxation as a whole; rather, they only objected to the government insurance scheme
providing for old age pensions and disability benefits.181
In response to the Court’s narrow interpretation, Congress enacted a broader ex-
emption in 1988,182 which remains in force, by providing an exemption from social
security tax for individuals who are members of religious organizations that are op-
posed to participation in the social security insurance scheme. The current exemption
provides that ordained, commissioned, or licensed ministers of churches or religious
orders, including Christian Science practitioners, as well as any member of a recog-
nized religious sect or division who believes that the teaching of their religion mandates
non-payment of social security tax may file for an exemption.183
6. Other Statutory Exemptions and Accommodations
There is an extensive list of statutory exemptions for religious belief in the United
States.184 A key example is the religious exemption in the Humane Slaughter Act,
175 See, e.g., PETER J. FERRARA, THE AMISH AND THE STATE 128–32 (Donald B. Kraybill
ed., 2d ed. 1993) (discussing the skirmish between the Amish and the IRS).
176 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 319, 79 Stat. 286, 390 (1965).
177 H.R. REP. NO. 213 at 102 (1965).
178 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
179 Id. at 256.
180 Id. at 258.
181 FISHER, supra note 39, at 215–16.
182 26 U.S.C. § 3127 (2006).
183 26 U.S.C. § 1402(d) (2000).
184 See generally Ryan, supra note 53, at 1445.
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which was enacted in 1958 in response to inhumane slaughter practices by some
slaughterhouses.185 Following the concerns of Jewish groups of the impact of the Act
on ritualistic slaughtering practices,186 Congress included an exemption for Jewish
ritualistic slaughtering and stated that ritualistic slaughtering is “one of the most hu-
mane methods yet devised.”187 The final bill provided an exemption not only for Jewish
ritualistic slaughter, but also for “any other religious faith that prescribes a method of
slaughter.”188 The legislation also provided that nothing in it “shall be construed to pro-
hibit, abridge, or in any way hinder the religious freedom of any person or group,”189
and, in order to ensure the protection of religious freedom, “ritual slaughter and the
handling or preparation of livestock for ritual slaughter are exempted from the terms
of this Act.”190 Following its amendment in 1978, the Act now provides that to qual-
ify for a religious exemption, an application must be made to the Department of
Agriculture, identifying the religious dietary laws at issue.191
Other examples of religious exemptions include Medicare and Medicaid pro-
tections for religious persons who do not believe in medicine so that they may still take
advantage of some programs,192 exemptions allowing religious persons who are also
members of the military to wear religious attire with their uniforms,193 and an exemp-
tion from the federal prohibition on peyote use for bona fide religious ceremonies of
the Native American church.194
D. Preliminary Observations
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to establish a theory about the religious
marketplace in the United States.195 A 2001 survey by the Pew Forum on Religious and
185 FISHER, supra note 39, at 222–23. Louis Fisher notes that many companies were
following old slaughtering methods of hoisting the animal by a single hind leg, and moving
it into a “sticker,” who knifed the jugular vein (which would not kill the animal, only cause
it to bleed), and “knockers,” who swung sledge hammers into the animal’s head. Id.
186 104 CONG. REC. 1654 (1958).
187 Id.
188 Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, § 2, 72 Stat. 862 (1958).
189 Id. at § 6.
190 Id.
191 21 U.S.C. § 464(a)(3) (2000).
192 Phil Galewitz, Consumer’s Guide To Health Reform, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 13,
2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2010/March/22/consumers-guide-health
-reform.aspx.
193 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
180,§ 508, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086–87, (1987). The provision was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court decision in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), in which the Court
held that the military had a compelling interest in pursuing a single standard of dress. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
194 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 (2007).
195 If we assume Adherent Definitions 1 (religious firms compete for adherents), 2 (a
religious firm is a church or denomination) and 3 (defining religious goods), as well as
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Public Life, based on interviews with 35,000 adult Americans, found that, broadly cate-
gorized, 78.4% of Americans identify as Christian, 16.1% as unaffiliated/no religion,
with Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism all claiming less than 2% of the
population as adherents.196 Within the Christian denomination, Protestants dominate,
accounting for 65.4% of Christian adherents, which equates to 51.3% of the total
population.197 The next largest Christian denomination is the Catholic Church, with
30.5% of Christian adherents, accounting for 23.9% of the total population.198
Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other Christian religions each account for less
than 2% of the total population.199
It seems appropriate, then, to characterize the Protestant and Catholic churches as
majority religious firms, and all other Christian denominations (e.g., Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses), as well as Buddhism, Islam,
Hinduism, and Judaism, as minority religious firms.200
Adherent Assumptions 1 (individuals act rationally in choosing a religious firm), 2 (religious
firms are profit (adherent) maximizers), and 3 (governmental regulation is an efficient means
of profit (adherent) maximization), we are left with Adherent Assumptions 4 (majority re-
ligious firms want high levels of regulation, minority firms want limited regulation) and 5
(religious liberty is dependent on the composition of the religious market). Even if we accept
the underlying premise of both Assumptions 4 and 5, it is necessary to characterize what in
fact the majority religion(s) and minority religion(s) are in the United States.
196 Luis Lugo et al., U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS & PUBLIC




200 From this, Adherent Assumption 4 can be restated:
Adherent Assumption 4 (Restated): The Catholic and Protestant Churches
will seek high regulation over the religious marketplace (i.e., restrictions
on non-Protestant or Catholic firms and high barriers to entry), whereas
all other Christian denominations, as well as Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism,
and Judaism will prefer limited regulation (i.e., broader religious liberty
and low barriers to entry).
Relatedly, assuming acceptance of Policy Assumption RIG1 (religious interests groups form
to represent the interests of related churches and denominations), we can also restate Policy
Assumption RIG2 and Policy Axiom 3 as follows:
Policy Assumption RIG2 (Restated): All RIGS are not equivalent and
RIGs separately represent majority religious firms (Catholic and
Protestant churches, herein defined as MARIGs), and minority re-
ligious firms (all other Christian denominations, as well as Buddhism,
Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, herein defined as MIRIGs).
Policy Axiom 3 (Restated): MARIG refers to two dominant religious
firms in the U.S. market, the Catholic Church and the Protestant
Church, which together hold a significant market share.
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The delineation of religious groups will be antithetical to the instincts of many
readers. The United States is commonly characterized as a pluralistic nation—a nation
with a high degree of religious liberty.201 However, even though the United States may
be viewed—and indeed may view itself—as a nation tolerant of a diverse range of reli-
gions, the question still must be asked whether, in fact, there is a disparity in treatment
between different religious groups. Questioning whether the United States prefers
the religious liberty of majority religious firms over minority religious firms does not
denigrate the protections and facial recognition of religious liberty and tolerance that
American culture has engendered. It is, however, questioning the authenticity of the
claims, and asking whether religious liberty is universal, or rather, universal for some
and conditional for others.
What remains, then, is to ascertain whether the public choice model is at least fa-
cially accurate in its assumptions: first, that legislators act to ensure their political
survival by enacting religious exemptions when it will increase the probability of
reelection; and second, that religious interest groups act to maximize the utility of their
representative denomination by seeking either targeted beneficial laws (MARIGs) or
generalized religious liberty (MIRIGs).
Examining the legislation in the case study vis-à-vis the public choice model sup-
ports further study into the potential for a significant paradigm shift in religious schol-
arly discourse in the United States. As a preliminary assessment, the legislation can be
characterized as favoring the interests of majority religious groups.202 The employment
discrimination legislation, the taxation legislation and, most recently, the RFRA can
be analyzed as examples of rent-seeking statutes that will increase both the availability
of the majority religion to the population and, indirectly, the wealth of that religion—
specifically, via taxation benefits.
The fact that accommodations in these key policy areas might benefit MARIGs
is not surprising. Religious lobby groups have been powerful throughout the con-
stitutional history of the United States203 and, at least through the first half of the
Returning, then, to Adherent Assumption 5, this assumption proposes that religious
liberty is dependent on the composition of the religious market. Specifically, Adherent
Assumption 5 proposes that a highly pluralistic market will result in a high degree of reli-
gious liberty and, conversely, that a religious market that is captured by one or a few religions
will result in a low degree of religious liberty. Based on the composition of the religious market
in the United States outlined above, Adherent Assumption 5 can be restated as follows:
Adherent Assumption 5 (Restated): The U.S. is a religious market that
is captured by two dominant religious firms (Catholic and Protestant
churches). Consequently, the U.S. has a low degree of religious liberty.
201 See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 1 (2008) (discussing America’s history of religious liberty).
202 This is only a preliminary application of the model. A complete empirical study is a large
undertaking and the subject of forthcoming research.
203 See FISHER, supra note 39, at 58–81 (showing various examples of religious activism
throughout U.S. history).
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twentieth century, MARIGs dominated lobbying efforts.204 In 1950, for example, of
the sixteen major religious lobbies in Washington D.C., ten were Protestant, with
two Catholic and four interdenominational.205 Taxation exemptions and employment
exemptions from the Civil Rights Act, then, are expected outcomes of both RIGs and
legislators acting to maximize their respective utility.
Notably, the RFRA, the taxation exemptions, and employment discrimination
exemptions all apply broadly beyond majority religions, equally to minority religious
groups. This could be seen to be the result of MIRIG utility maximization, when the
MIRIG has lobbied the legislator, the legislator has balanced the cost and benefits of
including or excluding minority religions, and the outcome is compromise legis-
lation. The MIRIGs, then, may have been able to free ride on the efforts of the MARIG.
Similarly, the RFRA, for example, could be an example of a broader and more ambig-
uous law passing responsibility to the courts.
Further, it could be claimed that some of the legislation in the case study might
support the model’s claim that MARIGs will seek to limit access to—and competition
in—the marketplace in order to maximize their own utility. An example of this could
be the conscientious objector legislation, both in its current form and from its inception.
As the legislation currently stands, conscientious objectors, though exempt from com-
batant training, will be assigned to non-combatant roles,206 potentially perpetuating
tensions for the objector (generally a minority religious believer, e.g., Quaker).
Other examples of barriers on accommodations for minority religious adherents
can be seen in the taxation accommodations, in which “religious organizations” are
required to apply for tax exempt status, whereas “churches” are automatically exempt.
Further, business income continues to be excluded from tax exempt status, seemingly
affecting newer evangelical religious groups who utilize technology to proselytize
worldwide. Additional barriers may be seen in the humane slaughter regulations, requir-
ing application by religious organizations to conform with their religious tenets, and
the restrictions on the use of peyote, limiting use to the worship service.
A more extended analysis of the employment discrimination example from the case
study highlights the potential of the public choice model in the religious exemptions
context. As noted in the case study, the United States has comprehensive federal laws
prohibiting employers from discriminating against persons for employment pur-
poses based on race, sex, color, religion, or national origin.207 Congress, however,
has provided for an exemption from these anti-discrimination provisions for both
religious organizations and religious educational institutions.208 As noted previously,
204 LUKE EUGENE EBERSOLE, CHURCH LOBBYING IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 24–56 (1951)
(listing religious organizations); RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 48–68 (1968) (listing religious organizations).
205 EBERSOLE, supra note 204; MORGAN, supra note 204.
206 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2006).
207 See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
208 Id.
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this exemption is a good example of Congress providing protection for the free exercise
of religion beyond what is constitutionally required.209
In addition to the protections offered by the Civil Rights Act, a bill offering leg-
islative protections based on sexual orientation is before Congress at the time of this
writing.210 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011 (ENDA) proposes to es-
sentially extend Title VII protections to Americans who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual,
making it illegal for employers to hire, fire, refuse to promote, or treat in a hostile man-
ner persons based on their sexual orientation.211 Various versions of ENDA have been
introduced in both houses of Congress since 1994,212 but what all the versions have had
in common is the inclusion of an exemption for religious organizations. In its current
form, ENDA does not apply to a “corporation, association, educational institution, or
society that is exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII.”213
What does the public choice model have to say about the exemptions for religious
organizations from both Title VII and ENDA? At its strongest, public choice suggests
that the religious lobby has used, and continues to use, political muscle to buy carve
outs from generally applicable non-discrimination standards.
In terms of substance, the religious exemptions in both Title VII and ENDA can
be read to fit the model as classic forms of rent-seeking, subject to criticism on two
economic grounds.
First, in the short term, the model predicts that costs would be imposed on one
group (MIRIGs) to the advantage of the proponents of the exemption (MARIGs). In
the case of the exemptions from employment discrimination laws, the model supposes
that the Catholic and Protestant churches, represented by their respective lobby groups,
caused the legislature to pass a statute that gives these proponents a concentrated bene-
fit at the expense of the minority religious groups and the populace as a whole. In the
context of employment discrimination exemptions, the cost is, of course, a relative
one. Though it is plausible to claim that some minority religious groups also prefer to
discriminate on the basis of religious—and in the case of ENDA, sexual—orientation,
it is certainly correct that, in economic terms, MARIGs benefit more. Given that
Catholic and Protestant churches are large-level employers of a multitude of persons
across many fields, the inability to discriminate would ultimately lead to a large-
level conflict between religious belief and firm behavior. These majority groups, then,
would be overtly and instantly less attractive for adherents engaged in a cost-benefit
calculus.214 Looking at it another way, the model would predict that if the legislature
209 See supra Part I.C.3.
210 H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. (2011).
211 Id. at § 4.
212 See, e.g., H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1863,
104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 4636, 103rd Cong. (1994).
213 H.R. 1397 § 6.
214 See Adherent Assumption 1 and Adherent Premise 1, supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
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did not pass the exemption, the Catholic and Protestant churches would lose adher-
ents to various minority religious groups, therefore having relatively less adherents
than they would if the exemption passed. Under the model, then, the exemptions yield
systematic benefits for the Catholic and Protestant churches and their representative
MARIGs. The exemption increases the wealth and availability of these majority groups
to the populace.
Second, in the long term, the model would predict that this rent-seeking exemption
diminishes competition (e.g., by increasing barriers to entry) and diminishes the ability
of society to respond to changing conditions in the population generally, and the reli-
gious market specifically. By enacting the religious exemptions and allowing the
MARIGs and their represented entities to enforce religious restrictions, Congress
condones a restriction on inter-religious competition and erects barriers to the reali-
zation of broader religious freedom from changing demographic conditions.
Under the process dimension, it would be expected that there would be an
exchange between the MARIGs (and any free-riding MIRIGs) and the legislators in
terms of votes promised. In the negative, it might be expected that there exist threats
of action by the majority institutions that would undermine a legislator’s ability to
gain reelection. The circumstances surrounding the introduction and continued passage
of ENDA provide an apt example of this type of exchange. For example, the United
States Catholic Church Bishops recently sent a letter urging members of Congress to
oppose the passage of ENDA.215 This letter is directly related to the Catholic Church’s
threat to shut down its open adoption and foster care program, as well as its charitable
work in Washington D.C., if ENDA is passed.216 In another example, The Washington
Post described an incident involving the Protestant Salvation Army, which hired a
Washington lobbying firm to press the issue of discrimination in employment
decisions.217 In documents published by the Post, the Salvation Army traded crucial
support for President Bush’s faith-based initiatives in return for legislative pro-
tection for religious and sexual orientation discrimination in religious organizations’
employment conduct.218
The exemptions from employment discrimination, therefore, can be read to fit
within the public choice model as favoring the interests of majority religious groups.
The employment discrimination legislation can credibly be characterized as an example
215 See, e.g., Tim Craig & Michelle Boorstein, Catholic Church Gives D.C. Ultimatum,
WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009
/11/11/AR2009111116943.html?referrer=facebook&sid=ST2009042801406; James Martin,
USCCB Letter on Same-Sex Marriage and ENDA, AMERICA MAGAZINE, (May 25, 2010,
11:30 AM), http://www.americamagazine.org/blog/entry.cfm?entry_id=2923.
216 Craig & Boorstein, supra note 215; Martin, supra note 215.
217 Patrick Martin, US House Sanctions Anti-Gay Discrimination by Religious Groups,
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (July 23, 2001), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/jul2001/fait
-j23.shtml.
218 Id.
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of a rent-seeking statute that will increase both the availability of the majority religion
to the population and, indirectly, the wealth of that religion.
Notably, the employment discrimination exemptions extend beyond majority
religions and apply equally to minority religious groups. This could potentially be the
result of MIRIG utility maximization, as the MIRIG has lobbied the legislator, the leg-
islator has balanced the cost and benefits of including or excluding minority religions,
and the outcome was compromise legislation. The MIRIGs, then, may have been able
to free ride on the efforts of the MARIG. Similarly, the RFRA, for example, can be
viewed as an example of a broader and more ambiguous law passing responsibility to
the courts. This leads to an interesting conclusion: although religious exemptions may
be passed by legislators in response to majoritarian demands, this process failure may
not actually harm minority religious groups. That is, though the legislative process is
overly responsive to MARIGs, the impact on MIRIGs could be positive, rather than
negative. An application of the public choice model to a subset of religious exemptions,
then, may expose process failures but not outcome failures.
Application of the public choice model to the case study, then, indicates at least
a plausible claim that MARIGs have successfully lobbied for classic rent-seeking
legislation, protecting their own interests over truly public ends (whereby the public
is presumed to be a religious free market).
What is the conclusion that can be drawn from the public choice model and the
preliminary observations? At the very least, examining legislation that accords accom-
modations and exemptions to religious groups through a public choice lens opens up
the possibility that the legislative perpetuation of religiously protective legislation is
a result of interests rather than ideology. The interest of religious groups is arguably
the expansion of their membership (i.e., spreading the Word of God), or, at the least,
being able to worship in an unrestricted manner. Both financial wealth and the number
of adherents causally affect the likelihood that these goals will be achieved. This pro-
vides significant incentive for dominant denominations to lobby to restrict access to
the religious marketplace, and, conversely, for minority denominations to lobby to
keep barriers to entry low, reducing any restrictions on their “religious trade.”219 The
interest of politicians is reelection, and it is the conflation of these two sets of in-
terests that determines how religious groups will be regulated in society. What an
interest-based account does, then, is to focus attention on a possible process-dimension
dysfunction: that the scope of religious liberty is conditional upon any (electoral) gain
to be had by legislators.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Once it is accepted that interests could potentially play a part in legislator decision-
making concerning accommodations and exemptions for religious groups, the focus
219 GILL, supra note 7, at 44–45.
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shifts to the consequent implications and ramifications for both religious liberty and
institutional design. Initially, any recognition that interest group politicking has con-
trol over legislative exemptions and accommodations may force us to reconsider the
general principle that religious liberty is above quid pro quo politics. This has signifi-
cant ramifications for issues of institutional design: if the current institutional arrange-
ments are fundamentally flawed and we continue to value the ideals of religious liberty
and religious pluralism, we should consider alternatives to the current institutional
arrangements. This Article considers an alternative with the judiciary as the target of
change, and an alternative focusing on legislative change.
A. Judiciary-Centered Alternatives
One possible response to any proved hypothesis that religious interest groups
largely control religious free exercise is that the proposition justifies more intrusive
judicial review. More generally, the interest group account of the democratic polit-
ical process has been used by constitutional scholars to argue for heightened judicial
scrutiny. These scholars can be generally grouped into three distinct groups.
First, one camp of scholars argues that interest group control of democratic pro-
cesses justifies heightened constitutional review.220 For example, Jerry Mashaw argues
that the Supreme Court should invalidate “private-regarding” legislation.221 Martin
Shapiro suggests that, at least with respect to the First Amendment, the Court should
not defer to a political process controlled by interest groups, but rather should advance
the interests of the under-represented minority groups.222 Cass Sunstein argues that
heightened constitutional scrutiny is essential to invalidate laws that, at their core,
reward the political power of interest groups.223 Another camp of scholars invoke anti-
trust law as a response to interest group capture of the political process. These scholars
contend, for example, that courts should employ some form of hard look efficiency
review of legislation claimed to result from interest group capture.224 Finally, a third
220 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 43, 46–47, 78, 80–81 (1989).
221 Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law,
54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 874–75 (1980); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the
Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 146 n.66 (1989).
222 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 2, 17–25, 31–40 (1966).
223 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
55–57 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1689–93 (1984). For other arguments that interest group theory justifies heightened
constitutional scrutiny, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985) (arguing that interest group
theory justifies far-reaching judicial review under the Takings and Contract Clauses), and
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 265–303 (1980). For an
excellent overview of this issue, see Elhauge, supra note 10, at 44–48.
224 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 51–54 (1984); Gary Minda, Interest Group, Political Freedom, and Antitrust:
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group of scholars contends that courts should utilize the tools of interpretation to offset
the impact of interest group dominance in the legislative process. For example, William
Eskridge claims that statutes should be narrowly interpreted when it appears that any
benefits of the statute are concentrated and the costs disbursed, and vice-versa.225
Frank Easterbrook and Cass Sunstein contend that statutes should be narrowly con-
strued when they represent interest group transfers.226 More broadly, Jonathan Macey
argues that the reality of interest group capture means that courts should narrowly con-
strue all statutes in derogation of the common law.227
Although there are clear differences between these alternatives, at their core all
of these groups of scholars are arguing for an expansion of judicial law-making
capacity.228 It is because of this implicit push toward an expanded judicial law-
making function that, at least in the context of religious free exercise, this institu-
tional alternative is not plausible.
In the first instance, there are a number of practical reasons why heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny is an implausible institutional alternative to the current arrangements
with respect to religious accommodations and exemptions. First, the Supreme Court
has indicated that, at least in the context of the Free Exercise Clause, it is unwilling to
undertake expansive judicial review and is particularly wary of judicial law-making.229
Second, even under the heightened strict scrutiny Sherbert doctrine, the Court has
rarely struck down legislation under the Free Exercise Clause, and there is no reason
to think that the Court would behave any differently under a post-Smith retreat. Third,
it is often difficult to identify precisely when legislation is the result of interest group
capture. As outlined above, some legislation may in fact be the result of compromises
whereby two, three, or four interest groups share in the legislative spoils, and it is un-
clear how courts are supposed to draw the line between what constitutes capture, and
what does not.
In the second instance, there is a deeper theoretical reason why heightened ju-
dicial review is not a plausible institutional alternative for the protection of religious
liberty: there is no reason to suppose that judges are any more wise or moral than
legislators230—that is, judges may equally be susceptible to acting with self-interest;
A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 935–37,
945–52 (1981); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A
Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61
B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1109–15, 1122–25 (1981); John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of
Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 743–44 (1986).
225 Eskridge, supra note 67, at 279, 298–99, 303–09, 324–25.
226 See Easterbrook, supra note 224, at 15–18; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471, 486 (1989).
227 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228 n.29, 252 (1986).
228 Elhauge, supra note 10, at 46.
229 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 34–38 (1993); see also KRAMER, supra note 45; MARK TUSHNET, supra
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for example, although not driven by the goal of reelection, judges may be driven by
the desire to perpetuate personal ideology.231 Indeed, given that judges are isolated by
virtue of constitutional tenure, the concerns of interest group animation of govern-
mental actors may in fact be amplified by relocating protection for religious adherents
to a democratically unaccountable judiciary. Ultimately, then, it seems strange to re-
place one collective decision-making process (legislative) with another (judicial) with-
out at least attempting to remedy the democratic collective process.
B. Legislature-Centered Alternatives
As an alternative to judiciary-centered institutional choices, another possibility is
that the public choice model demonstrates a need for scholars to focus their attention
on the internal processes of the legislature (or “supply side structure”). There are three
crucial junctures in the supply side structure that are worthy of attention.232
First, the current structure of voting creates the problem of issue bundling.233 When
individuals vote, they normally vote for one candidate from a limited set of candidates,
and that vote tends to be based on the candidate’s generalized platform or, to put it
another way, the candidate’s bundle of interests. In choosing between candidates based
on generalized platforms, individuals tend to vote for the candidate who best represents
their most intensely held preferences.234 This means that on more diffuse issues, indi-
viduals are either unable to exercise a preference or is underrepresented, even when we
assume the individual voter faces no informational problems and does, in fact, vote.235
Second, the current system of representation (i.e., territorial representation) neces-
sarily tends legislators toward pork barreling because each district’s congressional rep-
resentative is incentivized to support legislation that favors her constituents.236 It is far
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easier for a representative to claim concentrated benefits than distributed benefits,
meaning that, in effect, each district operates as an interest group. It is, therefore, easy
to see how a legislator whose district comprises eighty percent Catholic voters would
act differently than a legislator whose district comprised eighty percent Mormon voters.
Third, the intra-congressional committee system intensifies interest group
influence.237 Membership on committees is generally perpetuated by self-selection,
whereby legislators elect to serve on committees in which their constituents and sup-
porters have the greatest stake. Committees, then, are rarely represented by a cross-
section of the legislature (and, consequently, the populace more generally). When
this self-selection is combined with the heightened influence of committees over the
legislation under the auspice of any given committee, interest groups with influence
in a single district are able to extend that influence across the state or nation.238
The structure of the legislative process ensures that interest groups benefit from
organizational advantages that permit disproportionate influence on the legislative
process and, consequently, legislative outcomes. This influence results in legislation
that does not necessarily benefit the general public, but rather specific interest groups.
It seems, then, that if we focus on these structural junctures as sites for change, we may
be able to mitigate the influence of MARIGs on accommodations and exemptions. A
renewed focus on legislative structure and process seems to be the most promising
resolution of the demonstrated tension between majoritarian legislative consequences
and the desire for a generalized protection of religious liberty. At least in the context
of the Free Exercise Clause, a continued focus on inter-branch solutions simply perpetu-
ates theoretically and practically difficult ideals of judicial review. Instead, this Article
suggests that scholarship and debate should focus on progressing a broader protection
of religious liberty through tighter constraints on legislators at one or more of the iden-
tified junctures. By focusing on intra-legislative constraint mechanisms scholars can
progress a response that is not only more likely to achieve greater religious freedom,
objectively described, but is also cognizant of the political and institutional realities.239
CONCLUSION
Prior accounts of religious free exercise post-Smith fail to systematically analyze
the relationship between religious liberty and legislative exemptions. Indeed, the small
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body of literature that does examine the impact of Smith and the consequent legisla-
tive outputs simply states that legislative outputs do exist (i.e., outputs are greater than
zero), ergo the legislature is acting in a right protective manner with respect to religious
free exercise. A public choice model can rebuff these scholarly accounts of post-Smith
legislative performance and suggests that although the basic framework for protection
of religious liberty originates with, and is perpetuated by, the legislative branch, the
impetus for that legislation is legislator self-interest (reelection), resulting in legis-
lation that is more responsive to majoritarian religious interests, rather than religious
interests more generally.
The hypothesis could support the proponents of strong judicial oversight. However,
this Article concludes that, although the presence of a self-interested legislature pref-
erencing the interests of majority religious adherents for self-gain is indeed a cause
for concern, theoretical obstacles counsel against pressing for judicial review as the
consequent normative lesson. Rather, the preferred course would be to focus on
possible intra-legislative remedies for this interest-group lock-up of the legislative
actors. By limiting discussion of normative resolutions for interest group lock-up of
the legislative branch to intra-legislative remedies, the debate remains within the scope
of the current constitutional frame, making it more likely that the desired outcome of
strong judicial oversight proponents—heightened religious liberty—will be achieved.
